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INTRODUCTION

Jim Blutarski was an All-American defensive end for three years
at Faber College.' After his third year in college, Jim decided to
forego his senior season and make himself eligible for the National
Football League's college draft. Jim was chosen as the tenth pick in
the first round of the draft by the New Orleans Saints and eventually
signed a four year contract worth a total of $5.5 million.
After three successful years starting at defensive end for the
Saints, including two invitations to the Pro Bowl, 2 Blutarski notified
the Saints that unless they agreed to renegotiate his contract, he
planned to hold out from playing in the upcoming football season.
The Saints at this point had several options. If the Saints liked
Blutarski's performance, they could negotiate with him and provide
Blutarski with a raise, since the risk of losing his unique services for
the year greatly outweighed the raise he was demanding. The Saints
could also trade Blutarski to another team willing to deal with him for
adequate compensation. If worse came to worst and the club found
that it could not agree on new terms with Blutarski, and that it was no
longer feasible to keep his services, the club would have to release
Blutarski from his contract.
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California, San Diego. I would like to extend my thanks to Seattle University for the opportunity
to attend law school, and the entire law review staff for their work and help on this article. I
would also like to extend heartfelt thanks to my friends and family, whose support and guidance
have been instrumental to my success in life.
1. This hypothetical is fictional and not meant to represent or resemble any person living
or dead. Any similarities are unintentional.
2. The Pro Bowl is a professional football player's reward for excellence on the field and the
National Football League's All-Star Game. Players are elected to the game by their peers and
the game is played in Hawaii one week after the Superbowl.
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Is it fair that professional football players possess so much control
in renegotiating contracts? Do the players in fact possess the control
that we perceive them to have? Often, players do have most of the
bargaining power, as in the case of college players being chosen in the
draft. Once a team has chosen to pursue a draftee out of college, no
other team has the right to interfere with that process.3 If that club
fails to sign the player, the club wastes a valuable pick, and there is no
remedy for such a failure.4 But after that introduction into the league,
who retains control? It appears that the player still retains control
because, although the player is under contract, he can withhold playing
for the club until it accedes to his new demands.'
There is, however, a theoretical method by which the club can
even the playing field-self-help specific performance. 6 The self-help
specific performance remedy was originally created by Professor Subha
Narasimhan in response to her belief that there are certain situations
in contract law where the damage remedy is inadequate and traditional
specific performance is denied by the courts for reasons of inadequacies
in judicial administration.' Professor Alex Johnson, Jr. later adapted
the self-help specific performance remedy to the world of professional
sports contracts because he believed the National Football League was
an ideal arena for the remedy, satisfying all prerequisites enumerated
by Professor Narasimhan. 8 According to Professor Johnson, this
remedy calls for the club initially to accept a "superstar" player's
demands for more money and a contract extension so that the club
obtains actual performance on the contract that the player threatened
to breach.' Then, after the player has performed fully under the new

3. A club that drafts a player is, from the date of the initial draft to the date of the following
draft, the only National Football League (NFL) club that may negotiate for or sign a contract
with that player. If, during that period, the player does not sign a contract with the club that
drafted him in the initial draft, the club loses the exclusive right to negotiate for a contract with
him, and the player is then eligible to be drafted by another NFL club in the next draft. Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., The Argument for Self-Help Specific Performance: OpportunisticRenegotiation of
Player Contracts, 22 CONN. L. REv. 61, 67 n.19 (1989) (citing 1 R. BERRY & G. WONG, THE
LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES, § 3.41, at 178 (1986)).

4. See id. at 67.
5. This type of act is the focus of this Comment. The issue is not whether players should
hold the power in renegotiations. The issue is whether, if a player takes advantage of his position
and asks the club for more money, the club should be able to take advantage of its position and
trick the player into signing a contract that the club never intends to honor.
6. See generally Johnson, supra note 3.
7. Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE
L.J. 61, 86-89 (1987).
8. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 93-94.
9. The contract is breached when the player repudiates his duties under the existing
contract, first by giving the club notice of potential breach, then by not playing when the season
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contract, the club sues the player for any money the player received in
excess of the sum agreed on in the original contract, for the time period
covered by the original contract."0 Such a suit would be based on a
theory such as economic duress or the preexisting duty rule.
Although those with promanagement sentiment might agree that
this option should be available to the club," the remedy will not be
accepted by the courts12 because the clean hands doctrine poses a
major roadblock to the legal implementation of the self-help specific
performance remedy.13 Since the club acted inequitably towards the
player in signing a contract it had no intention of performing, the
player can invoke the clean hands doctrine as a defense, and the club
will be disqualified from taking advantage of the judicial
system to
14
recover the difference between the contracts' terms.
Before analyzing the problems that the self-help specific performance remedy faces, this Comment begins in Section I by describing
the self-help specific performance remedy as applied to professional
athletes. Section II then explains the clean hands doctrine and the
rationales behind it. Section III continues by explaining why the selfhelp specific performance remedy should not be exempt from the
defense of the clean hands doctrine. Section IV then concludes that the
clean hands doctrine is a proper defense and will defeat any attempt to
implement the self-help specific performance remedy.
I.

THE SELF-HELP SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE REMEDY

The self-help specific performance remedy proposes that if an
NFL player holds out, demanding renegotiation of his contract, the

begins, creating an actual breach. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1979).
See also McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1955) (quoting
McClelland v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 185 A. 198, 200 (Pa. 1936)). "In order to give rise to
a renunciation amounting to a breach of contract, there must be an absolute and unequivocal
refusal to perform ..
" Id.
10. Johnson, supra note 3, at 64. This proposal was developed in light of the lack of
adequate remedies available to the club under current contract law. "A promise to render
personal service ... will not be specifically enforced by an affirmative decree." RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 379 (1932). Even if the court could award the club specific
performance, there would be no effective means to monitor the player's performance to insure he
was playing to the best of his ability.
11. This Comment in no way seeks to support players who employ dishonorable means to
force the renegotiation of their contracts. Instead of being overjoyed to play, players who hold
out for more money show that they have forgotten the joy of the game and merely wish to be the
highest paid player either at their position or in the NFL.
12. See infra Part I.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part III.A.
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club should agree to the player's new demands and then contest the
modification on the grounds of economic duress or the preexisting duty
rule after the player has performed his duties fully under the new
contract. The club is thus seeking recovery for any salary it paid in
excess of what the player was entitled to under the original contract."1
This remedy requires that the club's suit for rescission of the renegotiated contract not begin until after the player has already delivered full
performance under that contract. 16 To do otherwise would eliminate
the possibility of the club benefiting from the player's ability during
the remainder of the contract.
However, before employing the self-help specific performance
remedy, the club must first address its theory of recovery in court.
A. Theories of Recovery
The preexisting duty rule, under the law of contract modification,
offers one theory of recovery for the club.17 Specifically, the club
would claim that it received no new consideration from the player for
the contract modification because the player merely agreed to provide
a service already called for under the original contract. The rule states
that the performance of a preexisting duty does not constitute sufficient
consideration to support a contract modification."8
Although the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts such a
rule, later sections of the treatise dilute much of its impact. If the
modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances not
anticipated by the parties when the contract was made, then the
modification will be enforceable. 9 However, a professional football
player can hardly claim that his level of performance under the original
contract increased by such a degree that it constituted an unanticipated
circumstance, not foreseen at the time of creation of the original
contract. In most football contracts, the player agrees to perform to
the best of his ability. Therefore, any increased ability by the player

15. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 92.
16. See id. at 98.
17. "Under [the preexisting duty] rule an agreement modifying a contract is not supported
by consideration if one of the parties to the agreement does or promises to do something that he
is [already] legally obligated to do ..
" Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 634 (R.I. 1974).
18. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.21 (1982).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981). See also Angel, 322 A.2d
at 636. "The modern trend appears to recognize the necessity that courts should enforce
agreements modifying contracts when unexpected or unanticipated difficulties arise during the
course of the performance of a contract, even though there is no consideration for the
modification, as long as the parties both agree voluntarily." Id.
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was expected by the club and cannot constitute an unanticipated
change."
In deciding whether to introduce the "unanticipated circumstances" exception, a player should think hard before opening Pandora's
box. By claiming unanticipated circumstances, the player opens the
door for owners to invoke the same concept. For example, in a
situation in which player salaries experience a downward trend, or a
competing league folds (thereby reducing the competition for obtaining
good players), club owners could claim unanticipated circumstances
that may justify modifying player contracts and reducing salaries.2
This Comment assumes that both Blutarski and the club knew of
Blutarski's full potential and ability to perform, such that any increase
in Blutarski's on-field performance would not surprise the club and
require greater consideration than that originally bargained for in the
original contract. The club anticipated Blutarski would develop into
a great football player. Given the fact that the club selected Blutarski
early in the draft and provided him with a lucrative contract, there is
no reason to believe the club was surprised by an improvement in
Blutarski's skills. Therefore, the club has not received any valuable
consideration or services from Blutarski not already considered during
the creation of the original contract. Barring the application of
equitable doctrines,22 most contract modifications not supported by
new consideration, and modified contract terms exceeding the time
period covered in the original contract,23 will probably be found
void-as should Blutarski's modified contract.
The second theory of recovery a club may claim in attempting
self-help specific performance is "economic duress." 24 Under this

20. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 94.
21. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 98. This example seems a little absurd, but many other
aspects of the sports and entertainment industry are equally so.
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. Most renegotiated contracts also call for a contract extension beyond the time frame of
the original contract just to protect against the threat of the preexisting duty rule and to insure
that the player will be covered in the future by the newly formed contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981). "Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which
is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration; but a similar
performance is consideration if it differs from what was required by the duty in a way which
reflects more than a pretense of bargain." Id. See also Air Prod. and Chem., Inc. v. Louisiana
Land and Exploration Co., 806 F.2d 1524, 1529 (1 1th Cir. 1986). "The payment of a preexisting
debt does not constitute consideration." Id. This would constitute adequate consideration for the
time period not covered by the original contract. However, if the new contract calls for increased
pay for the player during the period covered by the original contract, the player had a preexisting
duty.
24. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 99-102.
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theory, the club sues the player for damages because his new contract
was signed by the club under economic duress. In order to succeed,
the club needs to show an improper threat, a lack of a reasonable
alternative, and the inadequacy of ordinary remedies for breach.2s
A player who threatens not to perform a duty that he already
promised to perform, unless paid more money, seems to have made an
improper threat. The only potential problem is that a player probably
would not threaten not to perform, but rather threaten to play below
the skill level the club expects from him.26 This, however, does not
create a problem because a threat need not be express, but "may be
'27
inferred from words or other conduct.
The last two elements of economic duress-a lack of a reasonable
alternative for the victim to secure replacement performance and the
inadequacy of ordinary remedies-are related. Whether a lack of a
reasonable alternative exists brings our discussion to whether the
performance of a "superstar" athlete is unique, and therefore impossible to replace.28 When it comes to dealing with unique abilities in
personal services, especially athletic services, no one player performs
like any other. Every player has different strengths and weaknesses,
and therefore, no player can be substituted for another and be
considered an equal. As for the availability of an adequate remedy, the

25. Henry Mather, Contract Modification Under Duress, 33 S.C. L. REV. 615, 621 n.20
(1982). See, for example, Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Co., where the court was faced with a
plaintiff who filed suit to recover payments made under a contract with the defendant, claiming
the plaintiff was forced to agree to an increased price:
A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the party
making the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat precluding the
exercise of his free will ...[h]owever, a mere threat ... to breach ... does not in itself
constitute economic duress. It must also appear that the threatened party could not
obtain the goods from another source of supply and that the ordinary remedy of an
action for breach of contract would not be adequate.
272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971).
26. Although this may seem to hurt a player's market value, clubs generally know what a
player's ability level is, and, more importantly, when a player's contract is coming to a close.
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. a (1981). Cf.Gerber v. First
Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 332 N.E.2d 615, 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that "[t]he act or
threat upon which a claim of coercion is predicated must only be wrongful in a moral sense, not
necessarily a legal one").
28. It is important to note that we must be dealing with unique services for which there is
no equivalent substitute, or available means to evaluate the loss of such services. The best
method to demonstrate such a situation in the NFL is to use a superstar player whose
performance can be equaled by no one else in the league. Although defining a "superstar" is
difficult, it is best defined using Justice Stewart's opinion on how to identify obscenity-"I know
it when I see it .. " Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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only possible remedy would be a negative injunction.2 9 However, this
would only provide effective relief if another party is competing for the
playing rights of the player in question.3" Normally, there is no
competing entity, and therefore this remedy is inappropriate. Despite
the availability of a negative injunction, the Restatement specifically
states that, although possible remedies exist for the club besides
specific performance, the mere availability of some legal remedy will
not be considered to fulfill the requirement of an appropriate and
adequate legal remedy if it does not afford the club effective relief. 1
Provided that it appears that a prima facie case for economic
duress exists, several other factors must be considered before a court
will allow the theory to succeed. The first obstacle is that the club
must convince the court that an individual player victimized a wealthy,
In order to persuade the court, the club would
corporate entity.3
have to stress the intense pressure fans place on the club to produce
consistently successful seasons and highlight the bargaining power that
a "superstar" possesses because of this pressure from fans.33
The second obstacle the club has to overcome is that it must
disaffirm the modification to the original contract within a reasonable
time after the threat has ceased.3 ' Given that the club faces the loss
of the player's performance if it disaffirms the modified contract at any
time before the expiration of the contract, it should not be difficult for
the club to prove that it disaffirmed the modified contract within a
reasonable time period.3 S
Because economic duress is available to a club to fight an
opportunistic player,3 6 and because "the principal economic function
of duress has been to redress unjust enrichment,' ' 37 it follows that
economic duress is a viable legal theory to implement the club's claim

29. A negative injunction is a court-ordered injunction restricting a party from performing
services for competing entities. See, e.g., Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 cmt. b (1981). For an explanation
on what determines the adequacy of a remedy, see Ross Systems v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 173
A.2d 258, 262 (N.J. 1961), where the court held "[tihe adequacy of the remedy is to be tested by
a practical standard which takes into consideration the exigencies of the situation in which the
alleged victim finds himself."
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175, cmt. b (1981).
32. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 4.28, at 314 (stating that courts are apprehensive about allowing a claim of unconscionability by a sophisticated corporation).
33. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 101.
34. See id.; E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, § 4.19, at 267.
35. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 101.
36. This assumes that the corporation is able to convince the court that a player was able
to control the club's actions with respect to his new contract.
37. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS, § 9.8, at 349 (3d ed. 1987).
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for self-help specific performance.3" Provided that the club now has
an avenue for seeking self-help specific performance in court, should it
be allowed by the courts if the remedy of traditional specific performance will generally not be allowed as a club's remedy to holdout
players?
B.

Other Possible Remedies Besides Self-Help Specific Performance

Professor Johnson argues self-help specific performance should be
available to a club where the club is justifiably entitled to specific
performance and judicial limitations prevent the enforcement of
traditional specific performance. 9 A possible alternative remedy for
the club is the enforcement of liquidated damages. However, no club
has sought this remedy to date. The most significant reason why a
club would not wish to enforce a liquidated damages clause is the fear
that it would establish that a team can be monetarily compensated for
an athlete's breach, thereby negating the player's status as "unique,"
and in turn eliminating any possibility for specific performance.4"
Another possible alternative is a negative injunction. However, as
discussed above, this remedy is not applicable in the context of this
hypothetical.4

A last possible alternative remedy is traditional specific performance. Courts generally do not utilize this remedy unless it appears
that awarding damages will not make the plaintiff whole.42 Damages
are generally impossible for an NFL club to prove when faced with a
single player holding out, because revenues are generally shared
throughout the league.43 Despite extensive profit sharing, however,
38. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 102.
39. Id. at 92-93. See also Narasimhan, supra note 7, at 87.
40. See Edward L. Rubin, The Enforcement of Personal Service Contracts,3 ENT. & SPORTS
LAW 3, 6 (No. 1, 1984).
41. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1979). See, e.g., Nemer JeepEagle, Inc. v. Jeep-Eagle Sales Co., 992 F.2d 430, 436 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding plaintiff entitled
to specific performance of contractual provision calling for maintenance of the status quo pending
arbitration arising under the contract). The court further noted that the evidence established at
least a doubt concerning the adequacy of money damages to the dealer. Id. See also GuinnessHarp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that Guinness
had no adequate remedy at law and had sufficiently demonstrated entitlement to an injunction
when it lost the use of a distributorship that would likely cause loss of business and injure
Guinness' reputation-consequences for which compensation is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine).
43. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 3, § 2.10, at 68.
NFL clubs evenly share
approximately ninety percent of the revenues generated from football, thus the club's financial
success is based in large part on the league's overall performance and profitability. John C.
Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Competition and Cooperation
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some revenue, such as that from ticket sales, is not shared." Therefore, the club's actual loss stems from lost revenue at the ticket gate.
But if the club does experience a downward trend in this revenue, how
much of the responsibility can be placed upon the player?
The ultimate factor in determining whether a club loses money is
the team's popularity. However, it is nearly impossible to figure out
whether the lost popularity is due to the holdout player, management,
or any of the other players on the team.4 s Given the numerous
variables facing the court that must decide the exact amount of lost
revenue due to the club from a single holdout player, it is impossible
for a team to recover monetary damages on such a claim.
Even if traditional specific performance seems to be the appropriate remedy, several factors appear to negate its application. First, it
will not be awarded unless the contract's terms are sufficiently definite
to provide an appropriate basis for a judge's ruling.4" A player's
contract usually calls for little more than a player's "best efforts," and
therefore it can hardly be considered to be definite." There are so
many elements that affect a player's performance (such as weather, a
good defensive team, or trouble at home), that it is impossible for a
judge to order a player to perform better. A player's level of performance is not entirely within his control.4"

in the Sports Industry, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1018 (citing Los Angeles Memoria Coliseum
Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
990 (1984)).
44. Gate receipts are split 65-35 between the home and visiting team, respectively. BERRY
& WONG, supra note 3, § 1.32, at 59-60.
45. This problem is made more difficult when the club faces a player who threatens to
perform at less than his best. The player is active for the team and able to play, but will not play
up to his full potential.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 362 (1981). Comment (a) requires the
contract to be certain enough in its framework to provide a basis on which a judge can order
specific performance, and the judge must be able to determine whether the performance is in
accord with his or her order. Id. at cmt. a. See, e.g., Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556
N.E.2d 515, 521 (Ohio 1990) (finding specific performance necessary when the length of the
contract and the dramatic changes in market prices between the time of the signing of the contract
and the time for performance made an award of money damages impossible); Mr. Mark Corp.
v. Rush Inc., 464 N.E.2d 586, 592 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (ruling that defendant must perform
its part of the contract to sell its interest in a restaurant business, despite its insistence that the
contract terms relating to financing were not sufficiently worked out to constitute an enforceable
contract). But see Genest v. John Glenn Corp., 696 P.2d 1058, 1064 (Or. 1985) (ruling that the
contract for sale contained too many indefinite terms, such as payment schedule, to entitle
purchaser to specific performance).
47. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 103.
48. See id.
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A second factor that will probably make specific performance
unavailable to the club is the difficulty of administering the remedy.49
A court cannot effectively evaluate a player's performance on a
continuous basis or supervise him over an extended period of time."°
These concerns weigh too heavily on the court to allow a club this
remedy.
The last factor that may preclude specific performance is that
courts do not like to enforce service contracts" l because they worry
about involuntary servitude.5 2 Furthermore, it seems absurd for the
court to force parties to interact with each other, especially after
tensions between parties have already mounted.13 When all of these
factors are taken into consideration, courts will likely never instruct a
player to specifically perform his part of a sports service contract.
While traditional specific performance looks bleak as a remedy,
Professor Johnson argues that self-help specific performance is an ideal
remedy for a club (the performance occurs before a player knows he is

49.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 366 cmt. a (1979).

See also Storch v.

Erol's, 620 A.2d 408, 413-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993) (denying plaintiffs request for injunctive
relief that would force defendant's business to remain open, because it necessarily required
continuous employee supervision over an extended period of time, making effective enforcement
unreasonably difficult).
50. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 103.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1979). See also In re Noonan, 17
B.R. 793, 796 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (ruling that defendant would not be forced to change his
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to a Chapter 11 bankruptcy because doing so would provide plaintiff with
opportunity to force defendant to render services under an existing contract; the court likened the
practical effect of its ruling to preventing the debtor from entering into involuntary servitude to
the recording company).
52. See American Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981).
"[Tlhere [has] emerged a more compelling reason for not directing the performance of personal
service contracts: the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude." Id. See
also Judge Harlan's opinion in Arthur v. Oakes:
But the vital question remains whether a court of equity will, under any circumstances
...prevent one individgal from quitting his personal service of another . . . [a]n
affirmative answer is not ... justified by any authority to which our attention has been
called or of which we are aware. It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to
compel him to work for or to remain in the personal service of another.
63 F. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1894).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) cmt. a (1979). See also
American Broad. Companies, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 283.
It has long been a principle of equity that the performance of contracts for personal
services depends upon the skill, volition and fidelity of the person who has engaged to
perform such services and that it is impracticable, if not impossible, for a court to
supervise or secure the proper and faithful performance of such contracts.
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going to be brought into court) and for the courts (who do not5 4have to
wonder about how they are going to administer the remedy).
Not only does self-help specific performance ease the courts'
worries about administrative problems, it eliminates their concern
about allowing involuntary servitude, since the courts' decisions will
come after the remedy has been performed; the courts will not force
the player to do anything.5 5 It could be said that what the player
doesn't know won't hurt him. This type of underhanded activity by
the club could, however, lead to strained relations between clubs and
players; nevertheless, the same argument applies to players who
continually threaten to hold out unless their contracts are renegotiated.
Professor Johnson argues that the self-help specific performance
remedy "promotes the public interest in the sanctity of contracts and
allows for the efficient utilization of judicial resources. '"56 Judicial
resources may be utilized more efficiently in self-help specific
performance because a step has been eliminated in the judicial process:
the court's duty of enforcing the remedy. However, there appears to
be a problem with the claim that entering into fraudulent contracts
"promotes the public's interest in the sanctity of contracts."5 " It is
difficult to imagine how, when one intentionally enters into a contract
without the intention to perform, the sanctity of contracts is promoted.
If anything, this conduct encourages the public to enter into fraudulent
contracts because they believe the courts are not going to provide them
with the traditional remedy they believe they deserve. It encourages
citizens to take justice into their own hands and away from the courts.
Contracts are not treated as sacred under the self-help specific
performance remedy.

II.

THE CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE

Despite the alleged benefits of the self-help specific performance58
remedy, there is one major impediment to its effective utilization,
and that is the "clean hands" doctrine.5 9 "The clean hands doctrine

54. See Narasimhan, supra note 7, at 87. "When the promisee achieves self-help specific
performance, the court isinvolved in the remedy at the stage when performance is satisfactorily
completed. The court does not have to enforce and oversee the contract's performance. It simply
refuses to enforce the modification." Id.
55. Id.
56. Johnson, supra note 3, at 112.
57. Id.
58. There may be other grounds upon which the self-help specific performance remedy may
be fought. This Comment, however, limits its analysis to the clean hands doctrine.
59. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 111.
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allows courts to refuse relief to any plaintiff who has acted inequitably. ''6 ° Accordingly, a player, when brought into court by a club that
wants its money back, can claim the defense that the club acted
inequitably, and if the court agrees, the club will be denied relief by
the court.61 The player will most likely claim that the club acted
inequitably by fraudulently and deceptively entering into the renegoti62
ated contract without any intention of abiding by the contract.
Professor Johnson argues that the clean hands doctrine does not
apply because it was the player's wrongful and opportunistic behavior63
in seeking the renegotiated contract that forced the club to act.
Following that line of thinking, Professor Johnson also claims that the
use of the self-help specific performance remedy actually promotes the
public interest in the sanctity of contracts and allows for the efficient
utilization of judicial remedies.6 4 And, similarly, the remedy has a
positive value which, in the long run, outweighs any negligible costs
occasioned by the determination of rights through trial.6" Believing
self-help specific performance will lead to the best outcome, Professor
Johnson urges that players not even attempt to use the clean hands
66
doctrine as a defense to the self-help specific performance remedy.
A.

History of the Clean Hands Doctrine

The clean hands doctrine originated in the courts of equity and
demanded that a plaintiff who seeks equitable relief must come into
court having acted equitably in the matter for which he seeks a
remedy.6 7 Even though the doctrine originated in equity courts, it
has arguably been expanded to actions at law involving damages.68
60. William J. Lawrence, III, Note, The Application of the Clean Hands Doctrinein Damage
Actions, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 673, 673 (1982).
61. Id. "The clean hands doctrine allows courts to refuse relief to any plaintiff who has
acted inequitably." Id. See also 2 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 397, 399 (S. Symons
ed., 5th ed. 1941).
62. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 674. "The inequitable conduct which causes the
doctrine to be invoked must be willful, and usually involves fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad
faith." Id. See also Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592, 598 (3rd Cir. 1972).
"[The clean hands doctrine] does require that [the complaining party] shall have acted fairly and
without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue." Id.
63. Johnson, supra note 3, at 112.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 113.
66. Id.
67. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 674.
68. See id. "In California, the doctrine of unclean hands may apply to legal as well as
equitable claims and to both tort and contract remedies." Camp v. Jeffer, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329,
340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). "Furthermore, although the unclean hands doctrine originally arose
in cases seeking equitable relief, courts have expanded its application to contractual claims and

NFL Contracts

1999]

Since it has been proposed that the clean hands doctrine may be a bar
to the self-help specific performance remedy,6 9 this Comment assumes
the doctrine would be applicable as a defense to a contract claim.
In order to invoke the clean hands doctrine as a defense, the
defendant must show that the plaintiffs conduct toward the defendant
was willful, inequitable, and related to the plaintiffs claim.7" In
deciding whether inequitable conduct occurred, it must be determined
whether the conduct "would be condemned and pronounced wrongful
by honest and fair-minded" individuals. 7 For the conduct to be
considered willful and inequitable toward the defendant, the misconduct must actually affect the equitable relations which existed between
the plaintiff and defendant.72 The general types of conduct which
may invoke the doctrine involve fraud, illegality, unfairness, or bad
faith.7" Once the defense of the clean hands doctrine has been raised,
the trial court has the discretion to rule on the availability of the
defense. 4 Although the court has wide latitude in making its
decision, as the Supreme Court of Kansas emphasized in Green v.
courts should be
Higgins,7" when applying the clean hands doctrine,
76
integrity.
own
their
with
concerned
primarily
B.

Rationales Behind the Clean Hands Doctrine

There are three fundamental rationales behind the clean hands
doctrine, forming the basis for its utilization by the courts.77 The
first rationale is to protect judicial integrity.7" Courts fear that if

other matters in law." Grassman v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, Inc., 921 P.2d
224, 230 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).
69. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 111. "There is, perhaps, one major impediment to the
effective utilization of self-help specific performance by clubs: the 'clean hands' doctrine." Id.
70. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 674.
71. Bazyk v. Barter, No. 390715, 1995 WL 27477, at *2 (Conn. Supr. Ct. Jan. 19, 1995)
(quoting Boretz v. Segar, 199 A.2d 548 (Conn. 1938)).
72. Fina Oil and Chem. Co. v. Pester Mktg. Co., No. 95-1367-JTM, 1997 WL 225900 at
*36 (D.Kan. 1997). See also In re Caasa Nova of Lansing, Inc., 146 B.R. 370, 380 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 1992). "The plaintiffs iniquity must have resulted in injury to the defendant." Id. But
see Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 873 (3d Cir. 1959) (holding that a defendant who invokes
the doctrine of unclean hands need not be damaged).
73. Lawrence, supra note 60, at 674. See also Fina Oil, 1997 WL 225980, at *35.
74. The clean hands doctrine gives wide sweep to the court's exercise of discretion in
denying aid to an unclean litigant. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945).
75. 535 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1975).
76. Id. at 449.
77. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 674-75.
78. Fibreboard Paper Products Co. v. East Bay Union of Machinists, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64, 96
(Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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people are entitled to recover in court after acting inequitably, serious
doubts would be raised concerning the justice served through the
courts.79

In following such a theory, the courts are acting to protect

their own, rather than a defendant's, interests.8 °
The second rationale for the doctrine is to ensure justice81 and
to make plaintiffs answer for what they have done.82 It would be
unjust for a court to allow the inequitable conduct of a plaintiff to go
unanswered. This is especially true if plaintiffs, by their own actions,
have been party to conduct unfair to the defendant, causing the action
to be brought into court. The doctrine ensures a fair result by
preventing "a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression. "83
The third rationale is to promote the public interest.84 The
reasoning behind this rationale is that when a public interest is
threatened, the "doctrine assumes wider and more significant proportions."8 " Courts are allowed to use the rule not only to prevent an
"unclean" plaintiff from recovering, but also to restrict conduct which
may infringe upon the public interest.86
III.
A.

SELF-HELP SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE V. THE
CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE

The Club's Actions Allow the Player to Invoke the
Clean Hands Doctrine

In our hypothetical, the Saints agreed to accept Blutarski's
demands, placed his demands into writing as a newly formed contract,

79. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 675.
80. See, e.g., Gaudiosi, 269 F.2d at 881. "Courts are concerned primarily with their own
integrity in the application of the clean hands doctrine." Id. See also Winmark Limited
Partnership v. Miles 693 A.2d 824 (Md. 1997) (holding the clean hands doctrine is not applied
for the protection of the parties, but to protect the court from having to endorse or reward
inequitable conduct); Bazyk, 1995 WL 27477, at *3 (finding the trial court enjoys broad
discretion in determining whether public policy and the preservation of the court's integrity
dictate the invocation of the clean hands doctrine).
81. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 675. See also Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); Mas v. Coca Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 509 (4th Cir.
1947); Dunscombe v. Amfot Oil Co., 256 S.W. 427, 428 (Ky. 1923).
82. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 806.
83. Id. at 815.
84. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 675. See also Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815;
Republic Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Util., 319 F.2d 347, 349-50 (9th Cir. 1963); Baue v.
Embalmers Federal Labor Union, 376 S.W.2d 230, 236 (Mo. 1964).
85. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815.
86. See Lawrence, supra note 60, at 675. The defense of public interest arises mostly in
business competition cases. See Morton Salt Co. v. C.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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and promised to abide by all the new terms. In order for the player to
invoke the clean hands doctrine as a defense against the club, the club's
conduct must have been willful, inequitable, directed toward the
defendant, and related to the proceeding before the court. 7 When
analyzing the club's conduct under the clean hands doctrine, the club's
actions satisfy all the prerequisites for allowing the player to invoke the
clean hands doctrine as a defense against the club's suit.
It would not be difficult for a court to determine that the club's
actions were willful. The club listened to the player and his demands,
thought of its reaction, agreed to the player's demands, and then
entered into a new contract with the player. In order for the club to
argue that its actions were not willful, it must claim it was giving into
duress initiated by the player. However, regardless of the player's
demands for a new contract, the club did not have to renegotiate with
the player. It could have traded or released him. Also, in order for
the club to successfully argue that its actions were not willful, the court
must perceive the player as holding all the cards; but such a situation
cannot exist. Economic duress, though a theoretical possibility, would
not be workable in the NFL context.
The club would have had to think of fighting the renegotiated
contract when it initially acquiesced to the player's demands; the club
would not enter into the renegotiated contract unless it knew it would
fight the agreement after the player performed his part of the contract. 88
Just as the court will be able to find that the club acted willfully,
it will be able to find that the club acted inequitably. The club acted
to defraud the player from the beginning. Black's Law Dictionary
defines fraud as "[a]n intentional perversion of truth for the purpose
of inducing another in reliance upon it to part with some valuable
thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right."89 The club
knew that it was not going to honor the contract when it agreed to the
terms with the player. It knew the player would rely on the new
contract, and expected him to rely on it, since the player needed to
believe in the validity of the new contract in order to play for the club.

87. See Bazyk, 1995 WL 27477, at *2.
88. Although it can be argued that the club entered into the renegotiation not expecting to
fight the contract, learned of the self-help specific performance remedy during the contract, and
money back, the odds are that the club would not
then later decided to use the remedy to get its
want to fight the renegotiated contract since it originally entered into the contract willing to pay
the higher price. See also infra note 90.
89.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (6th ed. 1990).
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While performing, the player parted with something very valuable-his
unique athletic skills."
Fraud is considered inequitable conduct, and as such, courts have
set out fraud specifically as being a basis for invoking the clean hands
doctrine: "Conduct which will render a party's hands unclean so as to
deny him access to a court of equity must be willful conduct which is
fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable."9 1 The club's fraudulent action
was directed at the player and was in direct relation to the action
brought into court. There should be no question that a fraud was
perpetrated against the player.
The club's action to deceive the player is also easily shown to be
directly linked to the action before the court. The club's suit is to
negate the renegotiated contract. The club's fraudulent formation of
the renegotiated contract is the conduct in question. Therefore, the
fraudulent behavior is directly linked to the action before the court.
Following all this, one could predict that the case will be
dismissed because the club had unclean hands. However, Professor
Johnson argues that the clean hands doctrine defense runs into trouble.
B.

Possible Questions Regarding the Clean Hands
Doctrine and Responses

Despite the power of the clean hands doctrine, Professor Johnson
claims that it can be bypassed because "the player started it."'92 But
equity is not concerned with who "started it"; what matters is who
brought the suit to court. The clean hands doctrine requires "that
where a party comes into equity for relief he must show his conduct
has been fair, equitable and honest as to the particular controversy in
issue. ' Similarly, "[t]his maxim

. . .

closes the doors of a court of

equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the

90. It can be argued that a club could originally agree to a new contract without knowing
of the self-help specific performance remedy, and then later, during the new contract, be
counseled to try this self-help remedy, negating the intentional aspect of fraud from the time
period covering the signing of the contract. For the sake of simplicity, this Comment assumes
all club owners know of the self-help specific performance remedy and players have not yet been
informed, since players who know of this possible remedy will likely contract against such actions
when creating their new contracts.
91. Fina Oil and Chem. Co. v. Pester Mktg. Co., No. 95-1367-JTM, 1997 WL 225900,
at *36 (emphasis added) (citing Seal v. Seal, 510 P.2d 167 (Kan. 1973)).
92. Johnson, supra note 3, at 112. "However, any claim that self-help specific performance
should be barred through the use of the clean hands doctrine . . . ignores that it is the player's
wrongful and opportunistic behavior in seeking the renegotiated contract that precipitates the
club's actions to agree to and later seek rescission of the modified agreement." Id.
93. Bazyk, 1995 WL 27477, at *2 (emphasis added). This Comment will proceed with the
notion that the equity requirement has been enlarged to include actions at law as well.

1999]

NFL Contracts

matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the
behavior of the defendant."94 Although the player did initiate the
situation, application of the clean hands doctrine will deny relief to the
plaintiff because the court will refuse to lend its aid to either party in
such a transaction.
Professor Johnson claims that the player has also entered court
with unclean hands and therefore should not be allowed to invoke the
defense to benefit from his own inequitable conduct.9 Case law has
addressed this exact situation where both parties have come into court
after acting inequitably: "If a defendant has been guilty of conduct
more unconscionable and unworthy than that of the plaintiff, the rule
may be relaxed." 9 6 According to this rule, if the defendant has been
guilty of conduct more unconscionable than the plaintiff, the court may
choose to relax the equity principle. The plaintiffs conduct is
considered more important to the court than the defendant's actions.
Regardless of the decision the court comes to-whether to
consider the player's conduct or not-the player's conduct does not
sink to the low level of the club's. The player may be guilty of
unsavory conduct; however, this type of conduct is not worse than
intentional fraud and deceit. The player's conduct was definitely
willful. He notified the club of his intention to hold out if his
demands were not met, without any outside influences on this decision.
The player's conduct also might have been inequitable. The
player, arguably, acted opportunistically with regard to his original
contract by getting the club to agree to a renegotiated contract. This
opportunistic behavior technically could have breached the original
contract and provided the club with the opportunity to seek remedy in
the courts. The club, however, would not have gone to court. It knew
the player took advantage of a loophole because there is no adequate
remedy provided by the judicial system to a club fighting this type of
behavior.
However, the player's inequitable conduct was not more unconscionable than the club's. No matter how bad the player's conduct
may seem, he put the club on notice about the actions he was about to

94. Camp v. Jeffer, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added).
95. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 112.
96. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978, 983 (6th
Cir. 1937). See also USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir.
1982) (following Goodyear and allowing an injunction against the plaintiff while recognizing the
questionable conduct of the plaintiff, holding "the 'clean hands' doctrine does not absolutely bar
a 'culpable' plaintiff from equitable relief, for if the defendant's conduct has been more
unconscionable than that of the plaintiff the rule may be relaxed.")
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take. The player was up front about what he planned to do and left
nothing unsaid. Although he took advantage of a situation in which
he knew the club had no effective legal remedy, there was no deceit
involved.
The club, on the other hand, acted with full intention to deceive
the player. It attempted to get the player to perform for it, knowing
that the player would have chosen not to perform under their newly
renegotiated agreement had the player known the truth about the club's
motives. The club did have other avenues to pursue which were not
covert-such as trading the player to another team for one or more
players whose work would be the approximate equivalent of the
holdout player-yet the club decided to proceed covertly.
Courts have already faced issues similar to those in our hypothetical, in which both parties allegedly have been involved in improper
conduct. In analyzing the issue of fault, courts have found the clean
hands doctrine "is far more than a mere banality. It ... closes the
doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad
faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper
may have been the behavior of the defendant."9 7 Given this ruling,
it appears courts choose to focus their behavior analysis primarily on
the plaintiff. This is especially evident in the case of Green v.
Higgins.9" In Green, the court faced issues regarding a contract for
the sale of real estate.99 Although the court did not deal with a
professional sports contract, the issues discussed involved general
contract law and specific performance, which parallel the issues
presented in self-help specific performance.
C. Green v. Higgins: The End of Self-Help Specific Performance
In Green, the plaintiff and defendant conspired to form a
fraudulent sales contract for land in order to avoid paying a sales
commission to a third party.1"' After the conspiracy succeeded, the
defendant wanted neither to sell the land nor to carry out the
contract.' 0 ' The plaintiff attempted to fulfill the rest of the contract
by offering the defendant the remainder of the contract price for the
land, but the defendant refused to accept the payment." 2 The
plaintiff filed suit requesting specific performance of the contract, and
97. Burton v. Sosinsky, 250 Cal. Rptr. 33, 40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
98. 535 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1975).
99. Id. at 447.
100. Id. at 447-48.
101. Id. at 448.
102. Id.
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the defendant counter-filed a claim to quiet title to the land, utilizing
the clean hands doctrine against the plaintiff." 3 The case was
dismissed against both parties by the trial judge based on a finding that
both parties had engaged in conduct that was "willful, fraudulent,
illegal, and unconscionable,"' 4 and that neither party had come into
court with clean hands; therefore, neither party should be allowed relief
by the court." 5
The plaintiff appealed, claiming this was not an appropriate
defense since the defendant was a party to the inequitable conduct
which formed the contract. 6 The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed the decision, looking solely at the plaintiffs actions and holding
that "[a] court may refuse its relief to the plaintiff though the
defendant himself participated in the misconduct, not because it is a
privilege of such a defendant, but because the court refuses to lend its
aid to either party to such a transaction."'0 7 The Supreme Court of
Kansas was willing to rule against the plaintiff even though the
defendant was party to the inequitable conduct that led to the court
proceeding.'
Following the lead of the court in Green, any court faced with the
self-help specific performance remedy should limit examination of the
parties' conduct solely to that of the plaintiff. In our hypothetical,
because the club entered into the contract with the player knowing it
would go to court to rescind the contract, it is fair and equitable to the
player and the judicial system that the club's conduct be the sole
bearer of scrutiny.
The facts of our hypothetical case are analogous to those in Green.
Both the player and the club are culpable in our scenario, just as the
plaintiff and defendant were in Green. The plaintiff in Green sought
to enforce a fraudulent contract seeking specific performance, and the
NFL club is seeking rescission of a fraudulent contract for unique
services. Just as the court in Green ruled against the plaintiff for his
fraudulent conduct, a court should rule against the club for its
fraudulent conduct.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Green, 535 P.2d at 448.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id. at 450.
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CONCLUSION

The world of sports creates a legal beast completely separate from
regular business life. It allows players to engage in renegotiations
which resemble blackmail without any fear of criminal repercussions
and only a marginal fear of civil repercussions. The self-help specific
performance remedy was created to help level the playing field by
allowing an injured sports club the opportunity for restitution, where
the current legal system is largely unable to provide an adequate
remedy. Although Professor Johnson may believe that the self-help
specific performance remedy benefits our society, helps the judicial
process, and protects the public's interest in the sanctity of contracts,
in reality, it does exactly the opposite. The most viable argument for
the self-help specific performance remedy is that after one judicial
decision on the matter, regardless of the outcome, the subject will be
closed. Only one judicial decision is necessary because, following that
decision, players will realize the potential for clubs using the self-help
remedy and contract against such practices by clubs, rendering the
remedy moot.
This author does not condone the opportunistic actions of
professional athletes seeking to renegotiate their contracts; it is
completely unacceptable in the sporting industry. However, the
intentional deceit utilized by the club under the cover of the self-help
specific performance remedy causes the stomach to turn slightly more
than when faced with a player's potential holdout. Even though the
club is at a distinct disadvantage when faced with a potential player
holdout, the owner entered the industry with her eyes wide open. 0 9
Fraud is a line that should never be crossed. "Equity will not
permit a person to derive any benefit from fraud perpetrated by
him."'1 ° This should be the main policy reasoning behind denying
the self-help remedy. Fraud not only deceives the party at which it is

109. Another important point is that in the modern day of professional sports, the potential
for a hold out "superstar" is a very real possibility. Although, the clubs may not like the
circumstances when a holdout arises, owners voluntarily entered the professional football arena
knowing the likelihood that they would face the situation one day. This risk is a known part of
club management and should not allow the club to operate covertly and get away with the
deception. The decision to use the self-help specific performance remedy is understandable if the
club did not foresee the holdout, and it was a horrible surprise. The truth, however, is that
currently every owner can realistically expect a holdout renegotiation to happen to them.
Although the topic of assumption of risk requires more in-depth analysis, this Comment merely
raises the concept as a minor, alternative theory and will leave any further analysis to future
authors.
110. Duncan v. Dazey, 149 N.E. 495, 505 (Ill. 1925).

1999]

NFL Contracts

aimed, but it undercuts the public's faith in the party perpetrating the
fraud. This case involves a public entity deceiving an individual who
is well-known to the public."' This type of conduct undermines
peoples' faith in the validity of contracts. The public is witnessing
conduct that says, "We as the management of a professional football
team choose not to abide by the contract we made with this player,
because he forced us into it."
A perfect example of the behavior clubs should exhibit when faced
with a holdout player is the situation that occurred in Charlotte, North
Carolina, early in the 1997 football season. Kevin Greene, an
outstanding outside linebacker for the Carolina Panthers, held out for
more money. The club tried to negotiate with him, but he chose not
to accept its offer and the club released him.12
A similar situation occurred in Washington, D.C. Sean Gilbert
wanted approximately $500,000 more than the Washington Redskins
were offering in their multimillion dollar deal. The club did not sign
him to a renegotiated contract, and he spent the rest of the football
season watching games from his couch at home."'
These are examples of actions clubs should take in response to
holdout players, rather than getting involved in sneaky, deceptive,
contract tactics. Removing these holdouts from the league is one way

111. As indicated in note 11, supra, the author does not endorse holdout players, but rather
hopes they will get what they deserve later in their careers.
112. The facts surrounding Kevin Greene's holdout were as follows:
Kevin Greene was signed to a two year contract with the Carolina Panthers to play defensive
end. During the first year of the contract (1996), Greene led the National Football League in
sacks with 14.5. The Panthers proceeded to win throughout the playoffs that year, with the
season culminating in a loss to the Green Bay Packers in the National Football Conference
championship game (the only remaining game is the Superbowl).
Following such a great year, Greene wanted the Panthers to rework the second year of his
contract, giving him more money. The Panthers did not waste much time and released Greene
after giving up on trying to meet his demands. PRO FOOTBALL; Panthers Let Greene Go, Sign
Turnbull in His Place, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1997, at C3.
113. Sean Gilbert's situation was a bit different than Kevin Greene's. Gilbert was not
signed to a contract with the Redskins when he decided to holdout, but was designated the
Redskins "franchise" player. Under NFL rules, a player designated as a franchise player is
prohibited from entering into talks with other clubs as long as his team offers him a salary at least
equal to the average of the five highest salaries at his position-roughly $2.977 million per year
in this case.
Since the Redskins offer exceeded this amount, $20 million for five years, Gilbert was not
allowed to talk with other clubs. Gilbert, however, wanted approximately $500,000 more per year
than his club offered, despite recently having subpar years in sacks (11.5 sacks in the last three
years) when compared to the other top three pass rushers in the NFL. Since the two sides were
unable to come to an agreement by the signing date set by the NFL, Gilbert was forced to sit out
the rest of the season. Richard Justice, Gilbert Done Before He Starts; Deadline Passes to Sign
'Franchise'Defensive Tackle, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1997, at C1.
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for the NFL to show its strength. They may be good players, but they
are not good morale builders for the team. Although it is possible for
a player to hold a club by the reins, a National Football League club
should not be allowed to utilize fraud and deception to level the
playing field.

